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This paper explores Type 2 blindsight, a condition that challenges traditional notions of visual perception and consciousness. Despite the absence of visual awareness in the conventional sense, individuals with Type 2 blindsight demonstrate some degree of visual responsiveness to stimuli. The study delves into the nature of visual experience, questioning if and how visual awareness exists in such conditions.


Type 2 blindsight presents a unique opportunity to examine the boundaries of visual consciousness. Typically occurring after damage to the primary visual cortex, individuals with this condition report a lack of visual perception in certain areas of their visual field. However, when prompted, they can make above-chance guesses about visual stimuli presented in these blind spots.

Main Body

The Phenomenology of Type 2 Blindsight

The paper discusses the phenomenology associated with Type 2 blindsight, comparing it to normal visual experience. It investigates whether individuals with Type 2 blindsight have a different kind of visual experience, focusing on aspects like direct realism, the particularity of vision, and the transparency of visual experiences.

Theoretical Implications

The findings challenge the traditional view that visual experience is solely dependent on the primary visual cortex. They suggest that other brain areas might also contribute to visual awareness, albeit in an altered state. This has implications for our understanding of consciousness and the brain's adaptability.


Type 2 blindsight offers profound insights into the nature of visual experience and consciousness. By studying its phenomenology and underlying mechanisms, we can deepen our understanding of how visual perception operates beyond the conventional pathways and what it means to "see."


The paper concludes with an extensive list of references, underlining the robust research foundation supporting the discussion on Type 2 blindsight and visual experience.